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There have been many major developments in the law governing freedom of
expression over the last 60 years. Some of these developments have strengthened
the primacy traditionally given to freedom of expression by the common law of
the English-speaking world. Other developments have been less friendly to freedom
of expression. While I would argue that the favourable developments should be
heartily welcomed, I shall devote much of the later portion of this article to many
of what I consider the less felicitous developments that have created serious
challenges for judges charged with adjudicating conflicts between expression and
other basic values. In this article I am particularly, but not exclusively, concerned
with the conflicts between freedom of expression and privacy. The growing
differences between the law in the United States and that in Europe on these issues,
is apparent to all. It is too glib simply to assert, as some people echoing Laurence
Sterne might be prone to do, that “they order … this matter better in France”, and
leave it at that. The difficulty of enforcing judgments in the United States, in which
the defendant has not received the benefit of the protections given to speech by
the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, is well known.1
Conversely, as I shall shortly briefly show, there are also hints in some decisions
of the US Supreme Court during the past 20 odd years that open up the possibility
that the court might use some of the concepts that are being used to favour privacy
in Europe to narrow the very wide differences that are now taken for granted
between American and European law. I would find such developments regrettable
because I believe that the evolution of European law on freedom of expression
contains elements that I contend not only seriously impinge on the freedom of
expression but also impose impossible tasks on the courts that they are not really
suited to perform, and which I hope are never adopted, even in a watered down
form, in the United States.
Among the favourable developments have been the restriction, and in the United
States even the elimination, of the laws governing blasphemy2 as well as some
significant limitations on the reach of obscenity laws.3 In the context of civil
litigation perhaps the most favourable development has been the narrowing, and
1
See 28 U.S.C. §§4102–4103, enacted in 2010. Similar “libel tourism” legislation had earlier been adopted in a
number of states. See, for example, N.Y.C.L.R. §§302 and 5304.
2
See Burstyn v Wilson 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
3
See Pope v Illinois 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
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in the United States arguably the elimination, of the strict liability aspect of the
traditional law of defamation. I say arguably because there are hints, to which I
shall soon refer, that the Supreme Court may be prepared to take what I would
contend is the regressive step of restoring traditional strict liability in certain types
of defamation cases. The major positive development in this area has been the
series of decisions in the United States that made it impossible for public officials
or public figures to recover for defamation if they were unable to show with “clear
and convincing evidence” that the defendant uttered his defamatory statements
with knowledge of their falsity or reckless indifference to their truth or falsity.4
While the House of Lords was not prepared to take this gigantic step, the Reynolds
case5 expanded the qualified privilege of common interest—which allows someone
who had in good faith published a false and defamatory statement to someone with
whom he shared a recognised common interest to escape liability—to include the
“public interest”. This was likewise a major development that somewhat reflected
and in turn greatly influenced developments in Australia, New Zealand and then
later in Canada.6 As amplified in the Jameel case,7 this mutation of the common
interest privilege into a public interest defense, at least in actions against the media,
allows them to escape liability for false and defamatory statements if the published
material is the product of “responsible journalism” and concerns a matter of
legitimate “public interest”. Categories of expression that might claim this
protection have been said by various law lords to include political expression,
scientific expression, educational expression, and artistic expression, with none
of these categories having, as a general matter, any heightened degree of privilege
over any of the other categories. Their lordships, as is well known however, were
in agreement that the fact that the public is interested in a matter does not mean
that the matter is really of public interest. That is a question for the judiciary to
decide, and it is not, as we shall see, without some serious difficulties. Nor is the
problem confined to the United Kingdom. There are some indications that the
Supreme Court of the United States might be prepared to cut back on what appeared
to be a holding that even in litigation brought by private figures the plaintiff must
still show some fault on the part of the defendant with regard to the ascertainment
of the truth of his assertions.8 Some cases have hinted that the elimination of strict
liability may be limited only to actions against the media,9 something which would
be truly revolutionary, or, as hinted in one case, only to actions in which the
statements concerned a matter of general or public concern.10 This suggests that,
even in the United States, we might have a reprise, albeit to a lesser degree, of the
issues which courts in the United Kingdom must confront. As we shall see,

4
The leading case is of course New York Times v Sullivan 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Gertz v Robert Welch Inc 418 U.S.
323 (1974), has been generally thought to have extended Sullivan to require some showing of fault even in actions
brought by private figures. As we shall see that conclusion has been questioned in some later decisions.
5
Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 A.C. 127; [1999] 3 W.L.R. 1010.
6
See Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corp (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520; Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. 385 CA;
Grant v Torstar Corp (2008) 3 S.C.R. 640.
7
Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL (No.3) [2006] UKHL 44; [2007] 1 A.C. 359. In the more recent Flood
v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] UKSC 11; [2012] 2 W.L.R. 760, the court rejected what I would agree is an overly
restrictive interpretation of what could pass as responsible journalism.
8
See Gertz v Robert Welch Inc 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
9
Philadelphia Newspapers Inc v Hepps 475 U.S. 767 (1986); cf. Dun & Bradstreet Inc v Greenmoss Builders Inc
472 U.S. 749 (1985).
10
See Dun & Bradstreet Inc 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
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defamation is not the only field in which such a reprise might conceivably take
place.
At the same time as this amelioration of the traditional law of defamation was
taking place, the twentieth century also produced some substantial new challenges
to freedom of expression. These will be the primary focus of the remainder of this
article. The challenges arose first in the United States. The most important such
challenge was the recognition of a law of privacy which reached its zenith in the
recognition by the Restatement (Second) of Torts §652D of tortious liability for
publication of information concerning the
“private life of another … that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.”
Lord Nicholls in Campbell v MGN Ltd11 referred to that provision in the mistaken
belief that it represented the current state of the law in America.12 He was mistaken
in that assumption. In The Florida Star v BJF,13 decided in 1989, the US Supreme
Court overturned the award of damages to a woman who had been sexually
assaulted, and whose name was posted in the press room of the local sheriff’s
office despite a Florida statute forbidding publication of the names of victims of
sexual crimes. A reporter who had lawful access to the press room wrote down
the woman’s name which was included in a brief report of the incident in a local
paper. That there was also a notice posted in the press room that the names of the
victims of sexual offenses were not matters of public record and were not to be
published, did not alter the situation. In his dissent, White J. declared that, if BJF
had no remedy:
“I doubt that there remain any ‘private facts’ which a person may assume
will not be published in the newspaper or broadcast on television.”14
While accepting that most applications of §652D would probably now be
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of California grudgingly tried to limit the
holdings in the BJF case to apply only in actions brought by private plaintiffs
concerning matters recorded in public records or, if not contained in public records,
were otherwise of public concern.15 Finally, a subsequent decision of the US
Supreme Court refused to allow a tort remedy against someone who had lawfully
obtained and then published an illegally obtained recorded conversation of two
union officials engaged in a contentious labour negotiation with a local school
board because it involved an issue of “public concern”.16 If that distinction holds
up, a person who is in lawful possession of what might be called private information
which he knows has been illegally obtained, although without his complicity,
might nevertheless be liable for damages in tort if he discloses that information to
others unless the information pertained to a matter of public interest and concern.
This of course again suggests that the questions confronting the British courts
might also surface in America as well.
11

Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 A.C. 457.
Campbell [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 A.C. 457 at [22].
The Florida Star v BJF 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
14
BJF 491 U.S. 524 (1989) at 551.
15
Gates v Discovery Communications Inc 34 Cal. 4th 679 (2004).
16
Bartnicki v Vopper 532 U.S. 531 (2001).
12
13
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A final serious challenge to the primacy of expression is the rise in the United
States of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Many of the actions
in Europe based on invasion of privacy, or even Holocaust denial proceedings
instigated by private persons, could arguably have been brought under that heading.
As eventually described by §46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1965,
someone who “by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional harm to another” is subject to liability to that person.
Barring significant last minute changes this provision, in substantially the same
form, has been retained in the soon to be published Vol.II of Restatement (Third)
of Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm. I find this curious because
it is obvious that one of the ways people cause severe emotional harm to others,
often outrageously, is by expressive activities and the two times such an action
reached the US Supreme Court it had held that no action could constitutionally
lie. The first of these occasions involved the famous evangelist Jerry Falwell who
was the subject of a spoof in Hustler magazine of a well-known ad for Campari
in which celebrities described the first time they tried Campari.17 In the spoof
involving Falwell, the “first time” was in a drunken orgy with his mother in an
outhouse. The court held that as a public figure Falwell could only recover if
Hustler had said something untrue about him. In the Falwell case the jury had
found against him on his libel claim on the ground that no reasonable person would
have believed that the Hustler spoof was to be taken seriously as an allegation of
incest or even that a teetotaling clergy man was a riotous drinker.
One would have thought that this decision might have put the matter to rest and
required the Restatement (Third) to use less expansive language in the text of the
section itself or at least to include further amplification in the current comments
of the difficult constitutional issues raised by that provision. And indeed, in the
spring of 2011 the court again struck down an attempt to recover for intentional
infliction of emotional harm. Unfortunately, however, this decision left some loose
ends that, as in the privacy situation, may come home to roost. The case, Snyder
v Phelps,18 involved a demonstration organised by Phelps and the members of his
Westboro Baptist Church near the church where the funeral of a marine who had
been killed in Iraq was taking place. The demonstrators, though peaceful, held up
signs saying “Thank God for Dead Soldiers” and other even more vulgar messages
in protest of the US military’s changing policies regarding homosexuality. In an
eight-to-one decision the court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ overturning of the
substantial damages the father of the deceased marine had received in a jury trial
at first instance. The court held that, as vulgar and unfeeling as the signs were, the
demonstration was peaceful and involved a matter of public concern. One of the
majority, as well as the dissenting justice, thought that the plaintiff might have
had action under the so-called “fighting words”19 doctrine, a doctrine which although
ostensibly still good law has not been applied by the Supreme Court for 60 years
and was expressly rejected in the interim by important federal courts of appeals

17

Hustler Magazine v Falwell 485 U.S. 46 (1989).
Snyder v Phelps 131 S.Ct. 1207 (2011).
The leading case is Chaplinsky v New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568 (1942). No one could possibly contend that the
supposed “fighting words” involved in that case, calling a “city marshall” a “god-damned racketeer” and a “damned
fascist”, could possibly subject a person to legal liability today.
18
19
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decisions.20 Here again as in the privacy situation, by not ruling out a public concern
requirement in some types of situations, there is a suggestion that the courts in the
United States might possibly have to face some of the same problems that are now
confronting the courts in the United Kingdom, problems that, as I shall now attempt
to show, are not solvable in a way that gives adequate protection to freedom of
expression.
In an article written largely for a British audience, only a fairly brief summary
of the present state of the law in the United Kingdom is necessary before I present
the reasons why I find these developments unsettling and why I would be very
disappointed if they influenced the evolution of the law in the United States. As
is well known, in Campbell v MGN Ltd,21 the House of Lords, in a three-to-two
decision, expanded the nascent extension of the principle of “confidentiality” to
create what Lord Nicholls more accurately described as a broader right of privacy
than anything which had theretofore existed under English law. This was certainly
one way of accommodating the requirements of art.8 of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms which, since 1998, is
directly applicable in litigation arising in the United Kingdom and declares that
everyone “has the right to respect for his private and family life; his home and his
correspondence”. At the same time art.10 of the Convention declares that everyone
“has the right to freedom of expression”. Both these rights are defeasible for a
variety of important reasons including “the protection of the rights of others”.
Insofar as conflicts between individuals are concerned, the most obvious is that
between one person’s right to privacy and another person’s freedom of expression.
Resolving disputes involving a conflict between privacy rights and rights to freedom
of expression would be difficult in any situation in which the expression consisted
of true statements and did not involve any of the traditional common law restrictions
on disclosures that violate fiduciary duties or duties arising from agreements to
keep certain types of information confidential. The problem was made infinitely
more difficult when, following a resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe,22 European courts have accepted that the rights of privacy and
expression are of equal value. In the Campbell case, as is well-known, the House
of Lords held that the disclosure that Ms Campbell had been addicted to narcotics
was not actionable because she herself had put the issue into play by declaring
that she did not use drugs. On whether the Daily Mirror could also disclose that
she was attending Narcotics Anonymous and publish a photograph of her emerging
from a Narcotics Anonymous meeting, their lordships divided three-to-two in Ms
Campbell’s favour, although Lord Hope declared he would have ruled for the
Daily Mirror were it not for the publication of the photograph.23 It was accepted
nevertheless by all the law lords that when the disclosure of information not already
common knowledge is challenged on the basis of its being an invasion of the
plaintiff’s privacy, a defendant claiming that his statements are protected by his
20
See, for example, Collin v Smith 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 916. The case involved
the failed attempt to deny a “Nazi” group the right to march in Skokie, Illinois, a predominantly Jewish suburb of
Chicago, in the process of which an ordinance prohibiting the “dissemination of any material which promotes or
incites hatred against persons by reason of their race, national origin or religion” was struck down.
21
Campbell [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 A.C. 457.
22
Resolution 1165 (1998) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The Resolution leaves no
doubt that it was largely prompted by the tragic death of Princess Diana in August 1997.
23
Campbell [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 A.C. 457 at [121].
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right to freedom of expression must demonstrate that his expression concerned
matters of “public interest”.
Shortly after the Campbell decision, the European Court of Human Rights
imposed a plausibly more stringent requirement on those seeking to justify
expression claimed to interfere with another’s privacy. The case, von Hanover v
Germany,24 involved Princess Caroline of Monaco and photographs taken of her
and her children or of her and male companions either in public spaces or in places
clearly visible from public spaces. The German courts had ruled that, as a “figure
of contemporary society ‘par excellence’”, she could not complain of photographs
taken of her or of her and her male companions in public space or readily visible
from public space, although they did grant a remedy for all of the photographs
taken of her and her children on the ground that they invaded the family life of
Princess Caroline and her children. The European Court for Human Rights rejected
the German courts’ reasoning and held that all the photographs invaded Princess
Caroline’s privacy. It felt that well-known private figures, such as Princess Caroline,
and even public officials were entitled to some privacy even when they were in
public space. When expression was challenged on privacy grounds, the speaker
could only defeat the challenge if he could establish that his expression contributed
to a “debate of general interest to society”.25 This is obviously to grant greater
weight to privacy in situations which do not meet that criterion. I have no hesitation
in agreeing with the statement of David Thór Björgvinsson, the Icelandic judge
who was the sole dissenter when the Daily Mirror unsuccessfully tried to overturn
Ms Campbell’s victory on the merits in the European Court of Human Rights.
Judge Björgvinsson declared:
“The test implied in … [Lady Hale’s] opinion is the wrong one. From the
point of view of journalistic discretion in the presentation of a legitimate
story, it is the restrictions on freedom of expression that must be justified by
reference to ‘necessity’ and not the publication as such.”26
Regardless of whether one agrees with my position on the wisdom of allowing
judges to decide what lawfully acquired information it is permissible to circulate
to a wider audience, there is no disputing Judge Björgvinsson’s observation that,
despite the insistence that freedom of expression and privacy are of equal value,
as a practical matter one or the other value will be given primacy. In the United
States that primacy will be given to expression, the only question will be how
much primacy. In Europe, as all the cases indicate, privacy will normally be given
primacy with the only question being again how much. This is inevitable. The
belief that the matter can be satisfactorily worked out by a process of case-by-case
adjudication in a way that expression and privacy are in fact accorded equal value
is chimerical. It will be recalled that in the Campbell case, Lord Carswell expressly
conceded that different judges could legitimately have decided that case
differently.27 Indeed, of the nine judges who heard the case—one at the trial level,
24

Von Hanover v Germany (59320/00) [2004] E.M.L.R. 21; (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 1.
Von Hanover [2004] E.M.L.R. 21; (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 1 at [76].
MGN Ltd v United Kingdom (39401/04) [2011] E.M.L.R. 20; (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 5 at [4] of his “partly dissenting
opinion”. As is well known, the European Court, with some justification, unanimously ruled that the costs levied in
that case were excessive.
27
Campbell [2004] UKHL 22; [2004] 2 A.C. 457 at [168].
25
26
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three in the Court of Appeal, and five in the House of Lords—five ruled for the
defendant and only four for Naomi Campbell. She of course won because she won
over three of the five law lords. The same observation was made by Judge Cabral
Barreto in his brief separate opinion in the first von Hannover case. He noted that
it would
“never be easy to define in concrete terms the situations that correspond to
this ‘legitimate expectation’ [of privacy] and a case-by-case approach [was]
therefore justified”;28
while, at the same time, he admitted that such a “casuistic approach may also give
rise to differences of opinion”. Why anyone should be surprised at this result is to
me unfathomable. Any process that is truly based on ascertaining what is
appropriate under all circumstances is bound to lead to conflicting results in similar
cases because each case will to some extent be sui generis. That is why, in order
to give direction to lower courts, appellate courts have been inclined to giving
primacy to one or the other supposedly equal value in some particular type of
cases. Any attempt to resort to rule-like factual solutions to put some constraints
on such a decisional process can itself result in some very legalistic solutions.
After Princess Caroline prevailed in the first von Hannover case, similar
photographs of her were subsequently published. One of these sets contained
pictures of her skiing in Switzerland. In the second von Hannover case,29 the
publication of this set of photographs was permitted because it was part of a story
about what Prince Rainer’s children were doing when he was seriously ill. Princess
Caroline’s sister had stayed at home with their father, but Princess Caroline and
her brother, Prince Albert, were each somewhere else on holiday. The story, since
it involved the ruler of Monaco, was held to be pertinent to a “debate of general
concern”.
There is a more serious epistemological problem with a process of case-by-case
balancing of two basic interests of supposedly equal value. To balance two of
anything one needs some kind of common metric on the basis of which the two
can be compared and a way of determining the weight to be accorded to the two
competing entities. Even if one had a plausible method of weighing the value of
expression and privacy in a given situation, one faces the greater problem that
expression and privacy do not really have a common metric. Freedom of expression
is largely a political value. It does have some moral value but, in the contexts
which we are discussing, freedom of expression is a basic political value that
relates to the citizen’s relationship to the state and, within the state apparatus, to
the political appropriateness of having courts decide what the individual is permitted
to say to others. Privacy, on the other hand, in the contexts that we are discussing,
is largely a moral value. Privacy obviously has some political value but its political
value is greatest when an individual is seeking to preserve his privacy from invasion
by the state. There is no objective measure that I know of that can adequately solve
those conflicts by some sort of balancing process in anything approaching an
objective rather than a subjective manner. I certainly would agree that, from a
28
Von Hanover v Germany (59320/00) [2004] E.M.L.R. 21; (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 1 separate Opinion of Judge
Cabral Barreto.
29
Von Hannover v Germany (40660/08) [2012] E.M.L.R. 16.
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moral perspective, one would be inclined to favour Princess Caroline’s privacy
interest and perhaps also the privacy interest of Naomi Campbell. On the political
scale, namely the state’s ability to prevent an individual from disclosing to others
information that he has lawfully acquired through no breach of a pre-existing legal
obligation, I do not believe the balance is even close. When there are different
values in the varying scales on which expression and privacy can be weighed, it
is no wonder that what happens is that one of the two competing equal rights will
get preference as is indeed the case in Europe and the United States.30
One appreciates that the notion of human rights which underlies all modern
human rights conventions suggests something akin to a set of universal natural
rights that are the basic building blocks upon which all modern “just” societies
are based. As such it is not surprising that the rights recognised in these conventions
take on a life of their own. As a matter of sheer logic one could accept that Eady
J.’s defence of super-injunctions is well founded.31 He rightly points out that in
defamation actions a judgment for the plaintiff gives him vindication. One might
also say that an award for the unauthorised use of someone’s name for commercial
advantage compensates the plaintiff for a lost commercial opportunity. By contrast,
in a case like Campbell, and even more so in the cases in which super-injunctions
have been granted, the whole point of the legal proceeding is to prevent the
information in question from being made public and not to insure that the plaintiff
receives the economic benefit of the public disclosure of that evidence. That is
undeniable, but what conclusions follow?
One could arguably find justification for resorting to super-injunctions in art.6
of the European Convention which guarantees “everyone … a fair and public
hearing” but permits closed hearings for a number of stated reasons one of which
is “the protection of the private life of the parties”. If taken literally, that permits
closed hearings well beyond the traditional exceptions of national security, juvenile,
and possibly family matters heretofore recognised by common law courts. One
could find some support for such an expansive view of art.6 in the decision of the
European Court of Human Rights in Egeland v Norway.32 That case involved two
newspapers that, in reports about the conviction of a woman for a particularly
brutal triple murder, included a photograph of the woman as she was leaving the
courthouse after her conviction and sentencing to 21 years in prison. The editors
of the two newspapers were acquitted in the trial court in a prosecution based on
a Norwegian statute forbidding the taking of photographs of accused or convicted
persons on their way to and from court. The Supreme Court of Norway, however,
found the defendants guilty and imposed a fine upon them. When this case was
taken to the European Court of Human Rights that court found no violation of the
editors’ rights to freedom of expression under art.10 because the application of
the Norwegian statute in the circumstances under consideration was necessary not
only to protect the privacy interests of the criminal defendant but also to avoid
putting additional pressure on a defendant so as to ensure his right to the fair trial
guaranteed by art.6 of the Convention.

30
I have discussed these issues at great length in G. Christie, Philosopher Kings? The Adjudication of Conflicting
Human Rights and Social Values (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), particularly in Pts IV and V.
31
Sir David Eady, “Injunctions and the Protection of Privacy” (2010) 29 C.J.Q. 411.
32
Egeland v Norway (34438/04) (2010) 50 E.H.R.R. 2.
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From my perspective I prefer the approach taken by Lord Steyn in the case of
Re S (A Child).33 In that case the House of Lords denied a request that, in reporting
about a criminal trial, the press should be restrained from printing the name of an
eight-year-old boy as well as the names and pictures of his mother and his deceased
older brother for whose murder the mother was being tried. While the case was
pending the newspapers involved agreed not to publish the surviving brother’s
name. In the judicial proceedings there was expert testimony as to the possible
harm to the younger brother should his schoolmates learn of his relationship to
those involved in criminal prosecution. The mother, not surprisingly, supported
this attempt to restrict the newspapers’ reports about the trial. The trial judge and
two of the judges on the Court of Appeal refused the injunction. Hale L.J., as she
then was, dissented. The House of Lords affirmed the denial of the injunction. In
his speech, with which all the other four members of the panel agreed, Lord Steyn
said:
“In agreement with Hale LJ the majority of the Court of Appeal took the view
that Hedley J had not analyzed the case correctly in accordance with the
provisions of the ECHR. Given the weight traditionally given to the
importance of open reporting of criminal proceedings, it was in my view
appropriate for him, in carrying out the balance required by the ECHR, to
begin by acknowledging the force of the argument under article 10 before
considering whether the right of the child under article 8 was sufficient to
outweigh it. He went too far in saying that he would have come to same
conclusion even if he had been persuaded that this was a case where the
child’s welfare was indeed the paramount consideration under section 1(1)
of the Children’s Act 1989. But that was not the shape of the case before
him.”34
Lord Steyn’s position that fair and open trial provisions are, if anything, reasons
for emphasising the importance of freedom of expression rather than a neutral
factor or a reason for giving increased importance to a privacy interest makes
eminent good sense to me.
My conclusion is simply this: a jurisprudence claiming to value expression and
privacy equally will, in practice, give prima facie primacy to either the privacy
interest or the interest of freedom of expression, for otherwise there will be chaotic
inconsistency of result. My own preference is to give primacy to freedom of
expression because, from a political perspective, it is the foundation of a democratic
government. My second conclusion is that it is an elitist and extremely unwise
policy in an increasingly heterogeneous world to let judges decide what people
should know. I leave aside the obvious point that in a world connected by the
internet most such attempts will fail because as long as a sufficient number of
people are interested in the subject the information will get out. Forbidding the
publication of intimate details of Tiger Woods’ private troubles in the United
Kingdom35 was an exercise in futility since that information was already widely
available in the United States and readily accessible online.
33

Re S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [2005] 1 A.C. 593.
Re S (A Child) [2005] 1 A.C. 593 at [37].
See, for example, http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2009/dec/11/tiger-woods-gags-english-media [Accessed July
31, 2012].
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